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ABSTRACT

Voting is how we elect today’s voices, faces, and leaders in our country. It is argued to be
a very essential right we have as a people. A voter votes, by listing their preferences. Their
preferences are relating the candidates to one each other (i.e. whether they prefer candidate A to
candidate B or if they are indifferent between the two). There are many different social choice
functions that can be used to calculate the results of an election. This project glances over the
theory of Condorcet, Borda, Arrow, and Young, all of whom had a great impact on voting theory
and social choice theory. I experiment with partially-ordered preferences using the Partial Borda
Count.
The Partial Borda Count switches from being injective (one-to-one) to non-injective
(multiple posets going to the same score vector) for all elections with 5-elements or higher. I
created an algorithm that determines certain posets that go to the same score vectors for
n-candidate elections (if n > 5). My algorithm was able to detect all of the failures of injectivity
for a 5-candidate election. I then use this algorithm to see if I can predict which posets go to the
same score vector, for a 6-candidate election, without having to construct a 6-element database.
It turns out my algorithm proved successful in locating some of the injectivity failures of
6-element elections.
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Introduction

It is known that for a simple two-alternative election, the most optimal way of voting is
majority rules. Life is not this simple, most elections have more than two candidates, policies, or
alternatives to vote for. When an election exceeds two alternatives, majority rules is no longer
optimal. A more formal definition is given in the next chapter, but majority rules is essentially
won by a candidate receiving more than half of first-preference votes [10]. There is no way to
guarantee that any one candidate will get more than half of the voters to prefer it over the others
when there are more than two options for the voters to choose from. Not to say it is impossible to
reach a majority, but it is definitely not too likely or common.
So, what happens for elections with more than two candidates? This paper explores the
ideologies of Condorcet, Borda, Arrow, and Young. All of whom had an impact on voting and
social choice theory, specifically for when there are more than two alternatives to vote on. It
turns out that there is no voting system that can satisfy certain fairness axioms constructed by
Arrow. Out of the voting systems explored in the next chapter, this paper hones in on the Partial
Borda Count in conjunction with indifferent voting preferences.
For elections with up to 4 candidates, the Partial Borda Count is injective. Injectivity,
meaning one-to-one, each poset has a unique score vector that it produces. When there are 5
candidates in an election there are 4 pairs of different posets that produce the same score, this
fails injectivity. I generated an algorithm that can predict certain posets that produce the same
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score vector. Although my algorithm may not find all injectivity failures for elections exceeding
4 voting options, it does at least inform voters that even though their preferences could differ, the
score they give each candidate may not. There is a chance that two voters, with completely
different preferences and ballots can give the candidates the same scores. Involving indifferent
preferences expands the pool of posets a voter can produce. There is a much greater range of
opportunities for voters’ preferences when giving them the freedom to feel indifferent about
candidates on a ballot. This also allows for a more accurate representation of voter preferences,
since voters can list their true preferences. As opposed to Condorcet where a preference must be
given.
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Context

SOCIAL CHOICE THEORY OVERVIEW

Social choice theory, “is the study of collective decision processes and procedures” [15].
It aims to answer questions about analyzing individual preferences and social choice procedures,
then deciding which procedure is best for collecting these preferences.

Definition 2.1.1 Let there be two sets, X and Y, where X is the set of individual voting
preferences and Y is the set of candidates or alternatives. Let there be a function from X to Y. A
social choice procedure obtains all of the inputs from X and translates it into a single output (or
string of outputs in the case of a tie) in Y. Also called a social welfare function. [16]

There are five properties of a social choice procedure that are deemed desirable:
1. Always-A-Winner (AAW): each voter’s preferences must produce at least one
winner.
2. Condorcet Winner Criterion: if there is a Condorcet winner (will be explained
later), that winner is also the sole s ocial choice.
3. Pareto Condition: if everyone prefers candidate A over candidate B, then
candidate B is not a social choice, for all candidates A, B.
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4. Monotonicity: if a voter changes their ballot from the loser to the winner, the
results will stay the same.
5. Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA): let candidate A be in the social
choice set, but candidate B is not. If one or more voters change their preferences,
but do not change the relation preference of A to B, then the social choice set
should still not include B.

Note the following theories in this chapter fall under the umbrella of social choice theory.
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II.

MAJORITY RULES

Majority Rules is a long-established method of voting when there are two candidates.

Definition 2.2.1 Majority rules is a social choice procedure for two candidates. A candidate
wins when they rank higher than the other for at least half of the votes. [16]

When majority rules was established it was the only voting method that was considered
desirable, or completely fair at the time. Questions of what makes majority rules a desirable
voting system, and if there was another voting system that could be equally desirable started to
arise. This is what lead to May’s Theorem [16]:

Theorem 2.2.1 MAY’S THEOREM. If there is an odd number of voters, and the election produces
a unique winner, then majority rules is the only social choice procedure that satisfies:
●

Anonymity: all voters are treated the same, meaning if any two voters exchange
ballots, the results will stay the same.

●

Monocity: if a voter changes their ballot from the loser to the winner, the results
will stay the same.

●

Neutrality: both candidates are treated the same, meaning if all ballots were
revered, the election results will also be reversed.

●

Universal Domain: the domain must consist all logically possible profiles of
votes.
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[16]

There are some inefficiencies and concerns about the theoretical aspect of majority rules.
Maskin [11] lists some if these faults: intransitivity (a majority can prefer A to B, and B to C, but
still prefer C to A), indecisiveness (there is no guarantee there will be a winner, there are
multiple reasons for a majority not being reached), and susceptibility to manipulation, which I
will get into later in this chapter.
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III.

CONDORCET

The Condorcet voting method is a method that uses a series of pairwise comparisons in
order to determine the winner of an election. The Condorcet method is named after Marquis de
Condorcet, a man of many accomplishments, which include, permanent secretary of the
Academy of Sciences and member of the French Academy. Condorcet is said to occupy, “a
special place in the history of French thought. He is the last of the philosophes…He did not
conceive a completely original system, but he did create a synthesis of all the theories of his
predecessors” [8].Condorcet’s philosophy is based on a society where truth matters and voters
have the ability to determine what the truth is. In Condorcet’s eyes, there people are utility
maximizing, as it is in their best interest to do so. Condorcet’s beliefs view voters as accurate
decision makers who can make correct judgements when it comes to right vs wrong. These
judgements made by the voters are seen as objective. Since Condorcet comes from this
philosophical background, the purpose of his method is to find the collective truth through series
of majority rules games. The method is designed this way to maximize the voters’ probability of
making the ‘correct’ (socially optimizing) decision.
Social Choice Theory originated in the French Academy of the Sciences, and it was the
rediscovery of Condorcet’s work that started its development. However, a downside of
Condorcet's research is it allowed for other economists to selectively pick and choose from his
theory. Economists took partial information and formed arguments that are different from the
theory’s original purpose--to make the best collective decision.
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Definition 2.3.1 If a candidate beats all other candidates in a pairwise election they are known as
the Condorcet winner.

Example 2.3.1 For instance, if there are three candidates (A, B, C), A is only the Condorcet
winner if A > B, AND A > C by majority rules.

Definition 2.3.2 When using a social choice procedure and the election has a Condorcet winner,
if the social choice function chooses the Condorcet winner, that election is said to have
Condorcet Consistency (CC).

Condorcet Consistency allows for ties between candidates. However, if a voter feels
indifferent about a candidate and chooses not to rank them, that candidate(s) is assumed to be
ranked under the candidates the voter did rank [5].
Even though Condorcet’s theory was a very important stepping stone for social choice
theory, his voting system was not just accepted and then put into practice. There are certain
criteria set in place that can determine if Condorcet’s voting system is an adequate voting
system.

Definition 2.3.3 Electoral criteria are features required for a voting system to be deemed as
‘successful’.
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Definition 2.3.4 If the purpose of a criterion is to advocate for the candidate that best fits
majority voters, it is said to be optimizing.

Definition 2.3.5 If the purpose of a criterion is to reject voting systems that allow electoral
manipulation, it is called an anti-manipulation criterion. Anti-manipulation criteria is also
considered to be optimizing. If a system fails any anti-manipulation criterion, it is not likely to be
the best voting system. Therefore, these criteria can be called optimizing criteria. Note, there are
criteria that are only optimizing and do not share the anti-manipulation characteristic, but all
anti-manipulation criteria share the optimizing characteristic. [5]
The following are all examples of anti-manipulation (optimizing) criteria: [5]
No show- this is violated if a voter can benefit from abstaining their preferences
Let’s say there is an election between three candidates (A, B, C). Voter i’s
preferences are as follows: B > C > A. If it is better for voter i to not vote,
meaning if voter i abstaining from voting gives candidate B an advantage, then
this violates no-show.
Twin- this is violated if two people that have the same preferences would benefit if
one of them abstained from voting
Let there be a voter z whose preferences are also B > C > A. It follows voter z and
voter i have the same preferences. If B gets an advantage when voter i does not
vote, but voter z does (or vice versa) then this would violate the twin criterion.
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Truncation- this is violated if a voter can benefit from not listing all of their
preferences
Let there be a voter j whose preferences are: A > C > B. If A gets an advantage by
voter j only listing A > B on their ballot, then this violates truncation as j left C
out of their preferences.
The more candidates involved in an election, the more complex things get, and the less
likely that one candidate will beat every other alternative. Therefore, not every election produces
a Condorcet winner.

Definition 2.3.6 If there is an election where each candidate beats the other ⅔ of the time, there
is no Condorcet winner, and this is called a Condorcet Paradox.

Example 2.3.2 Suppose there are 3 candidates and 6 voters. If the ballots are as follows:
1. A > B > C

4. B > C > A

2. A > C > B

5. C > A > B

3. B > A > C

6. C > B > A

A is preferred to either B and/or C 4 out of the 6 ballots, which shows that it beats its other
opponents ⅔ of the time. Similarly for candidates B and C. This is a Condorcet paradox.

Due to the conditions of being a Condorcet winner, it can be pretty frequent that elections
do not have a Condorcet winner. Especially if there is a large number of candidates to choose
from. For example, it is easier for A to be a Condorcet winner if there are only two other

An algorithmic approach to detect non-injectivity of the Partial Borda Count
16

candidates, but when there are 10 other candidates, A must win all 10. This brings to question the
efficiency of the Condorcet method.
Condorcet’s method runs on completeness.

Definition 2.3.7 A ballot is considered complete if it allows voters to express their true
preferences between each pair of candidates.

This assumption inaccurately represents voters. There is a field in political science that
looks into voter rationality. Mathematical social choice theorists believe voters are rational,
meaning voters know and understand how to maximize their utility. Therefore, voters can state
their true best preferences in an election. This belief corresponds with Condorcet’s above
assumption of completeness. However, political scientists and economists question voter
rationality. Does anyone truly know what is best for them? If they do not, then their choices
cannot be rational, hence their preferences not complete. Under this way of thought, voter’s
preferences can never be complete.

Definition 2.3.8 Condorcet developed a majority principle, stating that if there exists a
candidate that has a simple majority over every other alternative, then that candidate should be
ranked first.

Theorem 2.3.1 CONDORCET’S JURY THEOREM. If each member of a jury has an equal and
independent chance at deciding whether or not the defendant is guilty, then the probability of the
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majority of jurors being correct is greater than the probability each individual juror is correct.
Therefore, the probability of majority jurors being correct approaches 1 as the jury size increases.
Let n (an odd number) be the number of jurors, let p be the probability a juror makes the
‘correct’ decision. Let Jn(p) be the probability a majority of the jurors make the right
decision. It follows if p > ½ and n > 3:
1. Jn(p) > p
2.

Jn(p) → 1 as n → ∞.

This theorem makes three main assumptions so there is always the question of whether or
not it is impartial or bias to certain conditions. Condorcet’s Jury Theorem is based on the
jurors having a shared goal, voting being statistically independent (probability of joint
occurrence is equivalent to probability of individual occurrence), and that the jurors vote
correctly more than ½ of the time.
It first assumes there is a common goal. When assuming there is a shared goal, what is
better for one is better for all, influencing p > ½ . This assumption creates an incentive for
jurors to choose correctly, which is restrictive and may not always be the case. In fact,
jurors are purposefully chosen so that there is no bias, so there should be no common
goal. It can be argued that the common goal of the jurors is to find justice. This could be
an incentive for the jurors to chose correctly. However, whether or not justice is found in
the end, the jurors remained unaffected. A goal cannot incentivize if there are no benefits.
It also assumes statistical independence contradicts social sciences. This would mean the
jurors did not communicate with each other, did not fall into peer pressure, and did not
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share common information. It is self explanatory how this might be the exact opposite of
what really goes on in a jury situation. [12]
There are also multiple versions of this theorem. For example, the above theorem proves
Condorcet’s Jury Theorem for groups with homogeneous behaviors/reliability. A statistician,
Hoeffding, came up with the following version of Condorcet’s Jury Theorem for heterogeneous
groups:

Theorem 2.3.2 Let S be the number of successes, n is the independent trials, and pi is the
probability of success on the ith trial. If c is a positive integer such that:
p=(p1 +...+ pn)/n > (c/n)
Then
P(S>c)> ∑ni=c(n i)(p)i(1-p)n-i

Then from here we can see if c=m+1 when n+2m+1, then the following theorem is made:
Theorem 2.3.3 If n>3 and p = average voter competency> ½ + 1/2n, then
(a) hn(p)=hn(p1,..., pn)>p and
(b) hn(p) →l as n→∞

IV.

BORDA
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The Borda Count is a voting method that gives each candidate a score based on each
voter’s preferences. The candidate with the most points wins. The Borda Count is also seen as
the arch competitor of Condorcet’s method. It allows for pluralism and was introduced by
Jean-Charles de Borda in 1170 [1]. Borda noticed that the alternative that is in first-place most
frequent, is not necessarily the optimal choice overall.
Definition 2.4.1 Suppose there are n candidates. Using the Borda count, the candidate in
first place gts 2n-2 points, while the candidate in second place get 2n-4 points, and so on
until the candidate in last place gets 0 points. The total number of points given on each
voter’s ballot is n(n-1). The candidate with the most points overall wins. An example
with candidates is given to the left. The poset to the left produces the following score
vector {6, 4, 2, 0}.

Example 2.4.1 Suppose there are 5 candidates: A, B, C, D, E.
Voter 3’s preferences: D
 > C > B > A > E.
Borda Count point vector:

However, the point vector that best portrays

{8, 6, 4, 2, 0}

Voter 3’s preferences is {10, 5, 4, 1, 0}.

A criticism of this voting method is that it weighs voter preferences equally spaced, when
a voter may feel differently as shown in the example above. Voter 3 strongly prefers D to C, but
feels less strongly about C to B. Another criticism of Borda Count is, like Condorcet, it does not
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allow for indifferent voting preferences. Also like Condorcet’s method, the Borda Count does
not have anything in place to deal with ties between any number of candidates.

Condorcet even came up with the following counterexample to Borda’s rule:
Example 2.3.2

[20]

It follows that with Borda’s Count, the winning preference is BAC, with B as the winner.
However, A has a simple majority over B and C, therefore with Condorcet’s method A would
have been the Condorcet winner. It seems like the main difference between Borda and
Condorcet, is Condorcet believes that candidates should be compared based on the relationships
with every other candidate individually, not taking into.
Overall, note that the Borda Count is near perfect. It is able to avoid Condorcet’s
paradox, however, it violates one of Arrow’s axioms, which will be mentioned a little later on.

Definition 2.4.2 Again, suppose there are n candidates. Using the Partial Borda Count, each
candidate automatically receives n-1 points. Then, each candidates loses a point for each
alternative ranked higher, and gains a point for each alternative ranked lower. All score vectors
should sum to the same total amount n(n-1). See the example below.
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Example 2.4.3 Simple Partial Borda Count Example:
There are five candidates, so each candidate starts off with 4 points, meaning the score vector
should equal 20.
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V.

ARROW

Arrow pointed out certain social choice conditions that are deemed desirable for a voting
system. He discovered that no such system can satisfy all of the conditions at once. Arrow
created new territory. Unlike Condorcet, and Borda, he started off by determining what a voting
system should do, what it should abide by. He then came up with certain properties a ‘fair’
voting system should have, and tried to concoct a voting system that could satisfy these
properties.
Arrow paid close attention to voters’ preferences. He realized that preferences strictly
needed to be ordinal, meaning the weight of preferences did not matter. Mainly because
weighted preferences are subjective and relative to a voter’s own personal scale. For example,
let’s say voter i gives candidate k a score of 10. Let another voter j give candidate k a score of
10. These two 10s can carry a completely different weight to each voter. Voter i’s 10 can be a 10
out of 60, while voter j’s 10 is a 10 out of 11. Even though both voters have the same weighted
score, the actual weight put on each score is different and unique to each voter. There is no
generic rubric to follow.
In his theory, Arrow portrays preferences as binary relations notated as, R{i}  [15].
Therefore, if voter i has the following preference: A > C, voter i has the following, equivalent,
binary relation aR{i}c.
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Definition 2.5.1 A binary relation is transitive (if aR{i}b and bR{i} c, then aR{i} c) and connected
(aR{i}b, bR{i}a, or both).

Definition 2.5.2 A voter has weak preference when they either prefer a to b with some
indifference or reservations. This is represented by aR{i}
 b.

Definition 2.5.3 If voter i has a strict preference, they prefer a to b with no indifference. This is
represented by aP{i}b.

Definition 2.5.4 A social welfare function is a function that assigns each profile to its binary
relation.

Definition 2.5.5 For some relation R, and any set X, the restriction is denoted R|X (restrictions
of R to X), and isolates the relationship(s) between the set of candidates chosen.
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Example 2.5.1 RESTRICTION EXAMPLE. Let there be an election with 4 candidates (a, b, c,
and d), and 3 voters. Let’s look at the following profile:

R
Preferences

R|{ a, b, c}
The restriction to the set {a,b,c}:

R|{ a, b}
The restriction to the set {a, b}:

Voter i - acdb

acb

ab

Voter j - bdac

bac

ba

Voter k - cdba

cba

ba

As mentioned earlier, Arrow started his process by listing some characteristics of what
qualifies as a just voting system. These characteristics are listed below along with explanations.
These characteristics are more appropriately known as ‘axioms’ because they were automatically
believed to be true.
ARROW’S SIX AXIOMS:

I.
II.

Voting system rationality:  the voting system only outputs total orderings
Determinism: the results are solely based off of the preferences of the
voters (i.e. there are no randomizations)

III.

Consensus: if all of the voters prefer a certain ranking, then the voting
system must also prefer that same ranking (e.g. if all the voters prefer A
to B, then the voting system must also prefer A to B)
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IV.
V.

Impartiality:  all of the voters are treated equally
Independence of a third alternative: the relative ranking of two
alternatives is completely independent of a third alternative

VI.

No dictators: the preferences of one voter does not outweigh the
preferences of every other voter
[16]

Theorem 2.5.1 ARROW’S THEOREM. If there are more than two candidates, there is no voting
system that simultaneously satisfies the six axioms above [16]

The above theorem is also known as the Arrow Impossibility Theorem, as it seems
finding a ‘perfect’ voting system is impossible. Tao [17] mentions in his paper that the first
axiom that usually has to be sacrificed is the Independence of a third alternative. Ironically, a
dictatorship would actually satisfy 5 of 6 axioms, as it of course violates the No dictators policy.
Arrow’s theorem is argued to be impossible because he is, “trying to do too much with
too little information” [15]. Therefore, his succeeders need to do at least one of three things, try
to do a little less (i.e. maybe not try to find a ‘perfect’ voting system), get more information on
voters’ preferences, or redefine what a ‘perfect’ voting system is, or a combination.
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VI.

YOUNG
Overall, Young did not agree with Condorcet’s voting theory, and believed that Borda

gives a more accurate appraisal of the best candidate in an election. Young challenges
Condorcet’s idea of there being a ‘best choice’. He believes that the value of each candidate is
relative and subjective. What is ‘best’ for one voter may not be ‘best’ for the next. While, as
mentioned earlier, Condorcet sees the majority’s choice as the optimal choice. Condorcet
strongly believed in finding the collective ‘truth’. Again, this deals with the dilemma of majority
rules. Why should 51% of voters be able to dictate the choice of the remaining 49%? Or even
50.1% able to carry the decision over the 49.9% of the population?
Young does not completely disagree with Condorcet, as he acknowledges that
Condorcet’s method could prove true for certain circumstances. However, “if the objective is
simply to reach the correct decision with highest probability, then clearly this is not the best one
can do” [19]. Young also does not completely agree with Condorcet's method for three or more
alternative elections, he does agree with Condorcet’s theory behind his theory. For example, they
both align on their view on a correct alternative may not exist for every election consisting of
three or more candidates.
Young views the maximum likelihood method as the best method for determining the
collective truth.

Definition 2.6.1 A vote graph (see Example 2.6.1 below) is a visualization of the three alternate
dilemma. The dots represent an alternative, and the arrows and lines show the direction of voting
preferences.
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Example 2.6.1

In the diagram above, 34 voters prefer A to B, 26 prefer B to A and so on. It follows that the
probability of a ballot will preference A > B > C or ABC is A > B + B > C + A > C = 26 + 33 +
15 = 74. The complete results of the example is listed below:
ABC ⇒ 74

BCA ⇒ 112$

ACB ⇒ 68

CAB ⇒ 98

BAC ⇒ 82

CBA ⇒ 106

Definition 2.6.2 It follows that the preference with the ‘maximum pairwise support’ is BCA,
which is also known as Condorcet’s rule of three [19]. In the example above, the Condorcet
rule of three would be BCA.
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CHAPTER 3:

Voter Preferences and Posets

Posets are a visual representation of voters’ preferences. Therefore, before getting into
the details of posets, one should first get a better grasp on voter choice theory. When I say voter,
I am referring to the average person that has the right to vote. Think of voting as listing
preferences, the order in which a voter ranks or prefers a candidate over another. It is possible for
a voter to not have a preference about a candidate in relation to the others, the voter is said to be
indifferent.
Definition 3.1.1 An indifferent preference means the voter feels neutral about the alternative
and cannot rank it in relation to the other alternatives. This is shown in a poset by an isolated dot.
This project involves indifferent voting preferences. Meaning a voter has the freedom to
feel indifferent about any candidate(s). Voting systems like the Condorcet method, and the
original Borda Count, do not allow for indifferent preferences; voters are required to rank all
candidates. This not only restricts the number of potential ballots that can be produced by voters,
but it is also causes some inaccurate representations of preferences. If a voter feels indifferent
about A and B, but has t o rank one over the other, then the voter is not able to list their true
preferences.
When I mention true preferences, I am using true interchangeably with best preferences.
So true preferences are the preferences that serve the voter’s views and beliefs the best way
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possible; the most optimal ballot for the voter. Giving a voter the opportunity to list their
preferences as they believe are best is important. However, most economic theory involving
people’s decisions (e.g. game theory) mention that people are not rational. The average person
simply does know how or does not prioritize maximizing utility, which is the most rational thing
to do.
“‘Precious few Americans make sophisticated use of political abstraction. Most are mystified by
or at least indifferent to standard ideological concepts, and not many express consistently liberal,
conservative, or centrist positions on government policy… the depth of ignorance demonstrated
by modern mass publics can be quite breathtaking’ and ‘the number of Americans who can
garble the most elementary points is … impressive’... most voters ‘know jaw-droppingly little
about politics’” [2].
The above quote while a little harsh, gives a brief and accurate idea of how people and voters are
viewed in economic theory. There is an argument to be made that if people are irrational, then
voters’ do not know their true preferences. While I will not go into the details about what this
means, it is definitely something interesting to note.
Now that there is some context, it is time to get to the purpose of this project.
Definition 3.1.2 A poset is a visual representation of a voter’s preferences using dots and lines.
Each dot represents a candidate, and the lines represent the relations between the candidates. If a
dot is disjoint (isolated), then the voter feels indifferent about that candidate. A poset is
equivalent to a voter’s ballot.
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*NOTE: I will be using the words poset and ballot interchangeably.*
Definition 3.1.3 A poset that connects all of the dots in one single relation (no disjoints or gaps
in the relation) is called a complete poset.
Definition 3.1.4 A poset that has a disjoint dot, or gap in its relation is called a disjoint poset.

I will be working with the Partial Borda Count (Definition 2.4.2). Here is a quick recap:
all candidates are given a score of n-1, points are gained by the amount of alternatives a
candidate is above, points are taken by the amount of alternatives a candidate is below, the total
amount of points given is always n(n-1).

Example 2.4.3 Simple Partial Borda Count Example:
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There are five candidates, so each candidate starts off with 4 points, meaning the score vector
should equal 20.

Theorem 3.1.1 A score vector {a1, a2, …, an}, where n is the number of alternatives, must satisfy
the following conditions:
1) a1 > a2 > ... > an  > 0
2) a1 + a2 + … + an = n(n-1)
3) a1 < 2(n-1)

Lemma 3.1.1 If there is a n-1 score in the first or last place of a score vector, then all of the
scores in the score vector must be n-1 in order to satisfy the second condition of Theorem 3.1.1.
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Proof. Let there be n candidates. It follows, the highest score in the vector (the first score)
is n-1. This means the vector takes the form {n-1, ...}. Let one point be n-2, producing a
score vector of {n-1, n-1,..., n-2}. It follows n-1 + n-1 + … + n-2 = n-1(n-1) + n-2 <
n(n-1). This violates condition 1 of Theorem 3.1.1. Therefore, the only way n-1 can be
the highest score is if all of the scores in the vector are also n-1 to produce the sum
n(n-1).
Now let n-1 be the lowest score in the vector, taking a form of {..., n-1}. Let one of the
scores be n, to produce a vector {n, n-1, …, n-1}. It follows, n + n-1 + … + n-1 = n +
n-1(n-1) > n(n-1). Again, this violates the first condition of Theorem 3.1.1. The only way
to produce a proper score vector with n-1 being the lowest score, all of the scores must
also equal n-1.
Therefore, if there is a n-1 score in the first or last place of a score vector, then all of the
scores in the score vector must be n-1.
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Below is a visualizations of all the possible posets (ballots) for 0- to 4-candidate elections:

All of the posets above have unique score vectors, meaning none of the posets produce
the same score. However, when illustrating the 5-candidate posets (listed in the appendix), there
were four pairs of posets that each pair goes to the same score vector (listed below). If thinking
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about the Partial Borda Count as a social choice function, it is injective until the domain exceeds
4.
5-candidate posets with same score vector:
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I noticed that for each of these groups of matching posets, there can be a generalization
made. Let’s look at the first group listed.

We can easily make these 5-candidate ballots, 6-candidate ballots by adding one disjoint point to
each, as seen below.

Notice how these posets still go to the same score vector. This is because adding one indifferent
candidate does not affect the relationship of the ordered candidates.

Example 3.1.1 The ballot below represent voter i’s preferences for 5 candidates, A, B, C, D, and
E (black). There is news of a new candidate, F, entering the election. Voter i is completely
indifferent about this candidate for whatever reason. Voter i’s new ballot is also represented in
the diagram below (red).
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Notice the 5-candidate poset before F
entered the election. It is a disjoint
5-candidate poset. This disjoint poset is
the

combination

4-candidate

poset

of
of

a

complete
relationship

between A, B, D, and E, and a disjoint
candidate, C. Therefore, when F joins as an indifferent, disjoint, candidate. It has no effect on the
relationships between A, B, D, and E. Hence, this complete 4-candidate poset remains
unchanged in terms how many points each receive and give away. The only thing the additional
candidate does affect is increasing initial score of all the candidates, which results in the score of
each candidate increasing by one.

To test this theory, I tried increasing the candidate number to 7, by adding another
disjoint dot to each. As seen above, the two posets still go to the same score vector.
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Theorem 3.1.1 Let there be a m-candidate election. There is a group of posets that go to the
same score vector. Let n > m, and let n-m = k. It follows this group of posets will go to the same
score vector for all n-candidate elections, as long as k disjoint dots are added to each poset.

Lets apply this to the two posets mentioned earlier:
We know these two posets match ( i.e. go to the
same score vector) in a 5-candidate election.
We’ve already seen that they still match for 6, and
7-candidate elections, and based on Theorem 3.1.1 they match for all elections with greater than
5 candidates when adding disjoint points. Therefore, we can make the following generalization
below for these two posets.
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I then went ahead and made this same generalization for the other three groups of posets that
match in 5-candidate elections.
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CHAPTER 4:

Results

The next questions to answer are what does this mean and how can we predict which
posets have the same score. I was able to construct an algorithm that can match certain complete
6-candidate posets to certain disjoint 6-candidate posets, then generalized it to work for any
complete n-candidate posets.
First I composed a database with all of the 5-candidate posets and their score vectors.
From there I looked at the groups of posets that had the same score vectors:

These four score vectors are the only ones that have multiple posets for 5-candidate elections.
Looking at this, I noticed that three of the four groups of posets that produce the same score has
one complete poset and one disjoint poset. From there, I wanted to see if there was some kind of
correlation or connection that I can use for 6-candidate posets, as composing all of the near 400
posets would be extremely tedious.

An algorithmic approach to detect non-injectivity of the Partial Borda Count
42

I then used one of the groups above to create the following algorithm. I know the disjoint
5-candidate poset can also be looked at as a complete 4-candidate poset with an extra
(indifferent) point that has a score of n-1 (the score all alternatives start off with), which in this
case is 4. Therefore, what happens if we remove this 4-point from the complete 5-candidate
poset?

This lead me to the following method:
1) Identify a complete 5-candidate poset with at least one score of 4
2) Remove that point from the score vector
3) Subtract 1 point from all other scores
4) Match this score vector to a complete 4-candidate poset
5) Add an indifferent, disjoint point (4-points)
6) Add 1 point back to every other score
7) This new score vector should match the score vector from Step 1
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The method mentioned above can be generalized for a complete n- candidate poset with a
n-1 point. The steps are as follows:
-

Step 1- Identify a complete n-candidate poset with at least one n-1 point

-

Step 2- Remove one n-1 point for the poset

-

Step 3- Subtract one point from the remaining scores

-

Step 4- Identify a n-1 complete poset that matches this new poset
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-

Step 5- If a match is found, add a disjoint vertex (n-1 point) to the poset, add one point
back to the other four scores, and it becomes a disjoint n-candidate poset that has the
same score vector as the poset from Step 1

I found the following posets with the same vector using the algorithm above:
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The method above helps find disjoint n-candidate posets using complete n-candidate
posets. However, when using this method, I had to semi-randomly put together a complete
6-candidate poset with a n-1 point and then see if it matched a 5-candidate poset that I already
had access to. What happens if we reverse this method? Can use the database I already have to
predict matches with complete 6-candidate vectors? The answer is yes, and the generalization of
the reverse of this method is as follows:
Reverse of Method 1:
-

Step 1- Identify a n-candidate score vector

-

Step 2- Add one point to each score

-

Step 3- Identify a spot to place a score of n-1

-

Step 4- See if there is a way to construct a n+1 poset that matches the score vector

{a1, a2, a3, …, an}= n(n-1)

{a1+1, a2+1, a3+1, …, an+1}= n(n) ✗
{a1+1, a2+1, ... n-1, ….}= n+1(n) ✔
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Using this reverse method, I compiled a collection of all of the 5-candidate (n) score
vectors, and applied the above method to it. I used a more arbitrary method to collect more
potential 6-candidate (n+1) score vectors. From there it was trial and error to see which score
vectors actually yield a poset. I was able to make the following observations.
Theorem 4.1.1 In order for an alternative to have n-1 points it must satisfy one of the following
conditions:
1) It has the same amount of alternatives above as below it
2) It is a disjoint point
Since I am trying to find complete posets, I can ignore the second condition and only
work with the first. Knowing this, I noticed that a complete poset cannot be constructed when
there was a 5 in the fourth or fifth place of the 6-alternative score vector. Why? There is not an
even number of alternatives above as below the n-1 point. When the score vector is set up like
the following {_,_,_,5,_,_} or {_,_,_,_,5,_} and the poset is a complete vector, the n-1 alternative
must give a point to all of the alternatives above it, however, there is not enough alternatives
below it to keep it n-1. What about when a score vector has a form of {_,5,_,_,_,_} or
{_,_,5,_,_,_}? There is still an uneven number of candidates above and below the n-1 point in the
score vector, however, all of the candidates below the 5-point, does not have to give a point to it.
Meaning, a score vector {8,7,5,4,3,3} can produce the following complete 6-candidate poset:
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A trend that I noticed, is all score vectors that started with 10 points were complete
posets. I then made the following conclusions:
Lemma 4.1.1 The highest score a n-candidate poset can have is 2(n-1).
Proof. Let there be an election with n candidates. It follows for a voter, one candidate is
above the rest. The candidate on top starts with n-1 points, and gains 1-point from every other
candidate. Note, this is the best any candidate can do. Therefore, it receives a score of (n-1)+
1(n-1) = 2(n-1). Since this is the best a candidate can do, 2(n-1) is the highest score a candidate
can receive in a n-candidate election.

Lemma 4.1.2 If a score vector starts off with a score of 2(n-1), then it must be a complete poset,
and there is a unique alternative on top.
Proof. Let there be an election with n policy alternatives to vote on. It follows from the
lemma above, if an alternative receives 2(n-1) points, it must get a point from every other
alternative. This means in a poset, every other alternative must be connected to it, and below it.
Since it is connected to every other alternative, the poset is complete. Since it is gaining a point
from every other alternative, it is the only one on top and shares indifference or is below no other
alternative.
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Below is a brief display of the results discussed earlier:
There are 6 places a point can be placed in a 6-candidate score vector. In order to find all
6-candidate posets with a 5-point, I tried putting a 5 in all 6 places of the score vector. I then
realized only two of the cases were even relevant to what I was looking for.
Case 1 - {5,_,_,_,_,_} ⇒ From the characteristics of a score vector, I know the only score
vector that can come from this case is {5,5,5,5,5,5}.
Case 2 - {_,5,_,_,_,_}
Case 3 - {_,_,5,_,_,_}
Case 4 - {_,_,_,5,_,_} ⇒ Could not construct usable score vectors.
Case 5 - {_,_,_,_,5,_} ⇒ Could not construct usable score vectors.
Case 6 - {_,_,_,_,_,5} ⇒ Equivalent to case 1.
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Case 2: {_,5,_,_,_,_}
1st # of score vector

Potential Complete 6-candidate score vectors

6

{_,5,5,5,5,4}

7

{_,5,5,5,5,3}

{_,5,5,5,4,4}

8

{_,5,5,5,5,2}

{_,5,5,5,4,3}

{_,5,5,4,4,4}

9

{_,5,5,5,5,1}

{_,5,5,5,4,2}

{_,5,5,5,3,3}

{_,5,5,4,4,3}

{_,5,4,4,4,4}

10

{_,5,5,5,5,0}

{_,5,5,5,4,1}

{_,5,5,5,3,2}

{_,5,5,4,4,2}

{_,5,5,4,3,3}

(_,5,4,4,4,3,)

*** Trend: I was only able to construct complete posets with the score vectors that started with
10***
Posets I was able to construct from the above vectors:
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Case 3: {_,_,5,_,_,_}
1st 2 #s of vector

Potential Complete 6-candidate score vectors

66

{_,_,5,5,5,3} {_,_,5,5,4,4}

76

{_,_,5,5,5,2} {_,_,5,5,4,3}

{_,_,5,4,4,4}

77, 86

{_,_,5,5,5,1} {_,_,5,5,4,2}

{_,_,5,5,3,3}

{_,_,5,4,4,3}

87, 96

{_,_,5,5,5,0} {_,_,5,5,4,1}

{_,_,5,5,3,2}

{_,_,5,4,3,3}

{8.7,5,4,4,2}

88,

{_,_,5,5,4,0} {_,_,5,5,3,1}

{_,_,5,5,2,2}

{_,_,5,4,3,2}

{_,_,5,4,4,1}

{_,_,5,3,3,3}

{_,_,5,5,3,0} {_,_,5,5,2,1}

{_,_,5,4,4,0}

{_,_,5,4,3,1}

{_,_,5,4,2,2}

{_,_,5,3,3,2}

{_,_,5,5,2,0} {_,_,5,5,1,1}

{_,_,5,4,3,0}

{_,_,5,4,2,1}

{_,_,5,4,3,1}

{_,_,5,3,2,2}

97, 10
6
98,
10 7
99,
10 8

***Trend: 10 9 and 10 10 score vectors cannot be constructed***
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Posets I was able to construct from the above vectors:
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Once I constructed the posets above, the next move was to see if any of these 6-candidate
posets have a match. The 6-candidate score vector undergoes the algorithm, a 5-candidate score
vector is produced, I used my 5-candidate poset database to see if the score vector it produced
actually exists, if it did then you found a poset match, if not the poset's score vector is unique.
When looking at the score vectors for each poset, I was able to get rid of all score vectors with a
score higher than 9 and posets with a score of 0.
We know from Chapter 3, that the highest score a score vector can have is 2(n-1).
Therefore, the highest score a 5-candidate poset can have is 8. So the 6-candidate posets with a
score of 10 points will never have a 5-candidate ‘match’ as when going through my algorithm,
10-points would become 9 (> 8) in a 5-candidate vector, which is not possible. If a 6-candidate
score vector has a 0 point, when it goes through my algorithm and 1 point is subtracted, it would
become a 5-candidate score vector with a negative point, is also not possible.

I was able to find the following matches from the posets above:
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Most of my research and experimentation was very trial and error, and situational. The
most solid and consistent finding that came from my experimentation was the method I created
for matching posets. Something to note is that the injectivity failure, that originates in
5-candidate elections, is only built upon. Meaning once posets match, they will always match for
all elections with a greater number of candidate (see Theorem 3.1.1). The injectivity failure only
increases and builds as the number of candidates increase; the quantity of elements/inputs that
fail injectivity.
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CHAPTER 5:

Conclusion

My algorithm did prove useful in finding failures of injectivity. However, the matches
that it can produce is limited, as it only applies to posets with a n-1-point, while I’m sure there
are many 6-candidate posets without a 5-point. Here are a few examples that I was able to
construct:

My algorithm would not work for the above score vectors. A great way to further the
research in this project would be to find a broader way of predicting poset matches, or finding
another condition (i.e. having at least one n-1 point, as required for my method). In creating this
method, it further proves that the function, Partial Borda Count is only injective when voting
with four options or less.
Once, a fifth option enters the equation, the function fails injectivity with four score
vectors that have multiple posets attached to it. Through Theorem 3.1.1, we know these four
anomalies are also present in every election with an option-size greater than 5. Meaning, when
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there are 6 options in an election, there are anomalies that are unique to 6-candidate elections,
like the poset matches listed in the previous chapter, plus the total anomalies from the
5-candidate elections that carry over. Therefore the total anomalies in 7-candidate elections is the
unique 7-candidate anomalies + 6-candidate anomalies (which includes the 5-candidate
anomalies). And so forth to theoretically infinity-candidate elections. This means that the failure
of injectivity just keeps accumulating and collecting more and more as the amount of candidates
increase.
For all n > 4, there are unique anomalies that fail injectivity. However, the total amount
of anomalies for all elections with candidates greater than 5 is dependent on the total anomalies
of all election-sizes before it. For example, you cannot know how many injectivity failures there
are in a 7-candidate election without knowing how many are in 6-candidate elections, which is
dependent on 5-candidate elections. 5-candidate elections are in fact the only elections in which
the total number of anomalies is independent, as it is when the existence of the failures start.
If voters can take anything from this project, it should be that when voting with the
Partial Borda Count, any two or group of random voters with completely different preferences,
can wind up giving the candidates the same score. Posets or ballots are not unique, they can
share the same result.
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Appendix
5-candidate posets (63 in total)
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